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Abstract Quantum signature (QS) is used to authenticate the identity of the
originator, ensure data integrity and provide non-repudiation service with uncon-
ditional security. Depending on whether a trusted third party named arbitrator is
involved or not, QS is classified as arbitrated QS and true QS. This paper studies
existence problem about the two kinds of QS and contributes to two points: 1) a
basic framework is provided to analyze the possibility of arbitrated QS on signing
quantum messages; 2) disagreement between the impossibility of true QS and an
existing true QS scheme is solved.
Keywords Quantum cryptography · Quantum signature
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1 Introduction
Digital signature, as an analogy to hand-written signature for authenticating the
origin of a message and ensuring the message not modified during transmission,
is an essential cryptographic primitive. It has been being widely used in various
security-related fields, particularly in secure electronic commerce. As Rivest, one of
the three inventors of the RSA algorithm, predicted, digital signature may become
one of the most fundamental and useful inventions of modern cryptography [1].
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However, all of the existing classical (digital) signature schemes were threatened
by last-increasing power of computers and innovative techniques such as quantum
computation since their security depends on the difficulty of solving some hard
mathematical problems. Once quantum computers is successfully built, most of
classical signature schemes will be cracked through Shor’s algorithm [2]. On the
other hand, development of quantum physics has thrown some light on the study
of cryptography for obtaining unconditional security [3,4,5,6,7,8]. So, researchers
turn to investigate quantum counterpart of classical signature. They hope that
quantum signature (QS) can provide unconditional security, namely the attacker
(or the malicious receiver) cannot forge the signature, and the signatory cannot
deny the signature even though unlimited computing resources are available.
QS is expected to sign both classical and quantum messages, and the form of
each quantum message can be a known quantum state or an unknown one. Since
known quantum states can be characterized with classical information, only the
quantum messages of the form of unknown quantum states are considered in this
paper. In 2001, Gottesman and Chuang proposed the first QS scheme based on
quantum one-way function, which is unconditionally secure even against quantum
attacks [9]. But this scheme works only on classical messages, and seems not prac-
ticable as it use up O(m) qubits of the public key for signing an m-bit message.
Subsequently, Barnum et al. showed that unconditionally secure QS for quantum
messages cannot be achieved [10]. This negative result did depress some researchers
pursuing positive application of QS. Fortunately, Zeng and Keitel presented a QS
scheme signing both classical and quantum messages by introducing a trust third
party named arbitrator [11] (this kind of QS was named arbitrated QS thereafter),
and the scheme was improved later [12,13]. Afterwards, Li et al. observed that the
GHZ states used in [13] could be replaced by Bell states, and then put forward
a more efficient scheme in [14]. But, Zou et al. proved the two schemes proposed
in [13] and [14] are both insecure because they could be repudiated by the re-
ceiver Bob, and further presented two arbitrated QS schemes to fix the defect [15].
Some other typical arbitrated QS schemes were also presented since the study of
arbitrated QS initiated by Zeng and Keitel [16,17,18,19,20].
Recently, almost all typical arbitrated QS schemes designed for quantum mes-
sages were found to have security problems of different extents [21,22,23,24,25,
26]. So, weather QS can provide unconditional security for quantum messages is
the key problem many researchers cared. To solve this doubt, we shall present
a detailed analysis of the reasons why unconditionally secure arbitrated QS for
quantum messages is possible and this does not contradict with Barnum et al.’s
conclusion. Note that some related preliminary reasons were simply mentioned by
Li et al. in [14]. In addition, Zeng et al. presented a true QS scheme in 2007 and
claimed it can sign quantum messages with unconditional security [27]. This result
stimulated the nerves of researchers in the field, and a question emerge: is Barnum
et al.’s conclusion in [10] wrong or Zeng et al.’s scheme in [27] insecure? We shall
answer this question by showing the insecurity of Zeng et al.’s scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews Burnum
et al.’s conclusion about the impossibility for signing quantum messages. Then
the arbitrated QS is shown to be able to sign quantum messages in Sec. 3, and
the disagreements between the impossibility of true QS and an existing true QS
scheme for quantum messages is solved in Sec. 4. The last section concludes the
paper.
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2 Review of a negative result on signing quantum messages
This section briefly reviews Barnum et al.’s conclusion claiming that signing quan-
tum messages is impossible to realize [10].
In [10], Barnum et al. proved a theorem that quantum authentication implies
encryption. This means that any scheme ensuring the authenticity of quantum
messages must also encrypt them almost perfectly. However, in a QS scheme, the
receiver should learn something about the contents of the quantum message but is
not allowed to changed it. It follows that the theorem results in the impossibility of
signing quantum messages: any non-trivial information obtained from encrypted
quantum messages is only possible at the cost of introducing disturbance to them
which implies the authenticity of quantum messages is destroyed.
To be better understanding, one can assume the receiver is allowed to efficiently
extract the original quantum message ρ, then it is easy to show the receiver can
generate a valid signature of a new message ρ′ favorable to him by the following
steps. First suppose the receiver can extract the original message ρ via the trans-
formation U and leave the auxiliary state as ϕ which may not be hold entirely by
the receiver. Since ρ should have been entangled with a reference system, ϕ must
be independent of ρ. Then the receiver implements the transformation U†, the
inverse process of U , on ρ′ and his part of ϕ to get a valid signature. Obviously,
this contradicts with the security of QS.
3 Possibility of arbitrated QS for quantum messages
In this section, we analyze why it is possible to design an arbitrated QS scheme
to sign quantum messages. It does not disagree with Barnum et al.’s conclusion
[10] and can provide unconditional security if it is properly devised. We also give
a basic framework of such a scheme as an example.
As mentioned in Sec. 2, Barnum et al. showed any protocol allowing a receiver
to read a quantum message also allows the receiver to modify the message without
the risk of being detected, therefore all potential receivers of an authenticated
message must be trustworthy. Obviously this will not happen for a general QS
protocol. However, in an arbitrated QS scheme, the arbitrator is always supposed
to be trusted by both signatory and receiver. We assume that the real recipient of
the authenticated message is the arbitrator who is in charge of the verification of
the signature. After verifying the signature, the arbitrator can send a parameter to
indicate whether the signature is valid. The receiver would obtain the indication
parameter, and only check whether the parameter and other information come
from the real arbitrator.
Recently, almost all existing arbitrated QS schemes were cracked [21,22,23,
24,25,26], but it does not mean that arbitrated QS cannot provide unconditional
security. The failures of the previous schemes are mainly due to imperfections
of design. For example, some schemes just employed quantum one-time pad to
encrypt, but ignored to authenticate the transmitted quantum messages. Quantum
encryption does not imply authentication, even though the converse is true [10].
Based on the above analysis, we give a basic framework of an unconditional
secure arbitrated QS scheme for quantum messages, which is composed of the
following three phases.
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– The initial phase: At first, the signatory Alice shares a key KA with the arbi-
trator using an unconditionally secure quantum key distribution protocol. The
receiver Bob also has a key KB shared with the arbitrator in the same way.
– The signing phase: Alice generates the signature SigKA(P ) of the message P via
a noncommutative transformation which means that there does not exist a uni-
tary operation U to satisfy U(SigKA(P )) = SigKA(UP ). Then Alice computes
σ = Aut(SigKA(P ), P ) for authentication. Note that Aut(·) denotes that un-
conditionally secure authentication is used such as the quantum authentication
scheme given in [10] for quantum information, and Wegman-Carter authentica-
tion scheme for classical information in [28]. The authenticated signature state
σ is sent to Bob.
– The verification phase: After Bob receives σ, he can implement the verification
with the aid of the arbitrator using the following three steps:
(1) In the beginning, Bob makes a random transformation on σ to obtain
TransKB(σ) according to the key KB . Then he produces the authenticated
state Y = Aut(TransKB(σ)) and transmits it to the arbitrator.
(2) After the arbitrator received Y , she checks the authenticity of TransKB(σ).
If there is anything wrong, the arbitrator would abort the protocol imme-
diately; otherwise, the arbitrator would recover σ from TransKB(σ) using
the key KB shared with Bob. Similarly, the arbitrator examines whether
SigKA(P ) and P are tamped or not. If not, the arbitrator would verify
whether SigKA(P ) is a valid signature of the message P . If the verification
process is passed, the arbitrator sets the verification parameter r = 1; oth-
erwise, sets r = 0. Finally, the arbitrator computes T = Aut(P, SigKA(P ), r)
and sends it to Bob.
(3) Bob authenticates what he received. If the authentication test is passed
and r = 1, he would accept SigKA(P ) as the signature of P .
The arbitrated QS scheme of the above framework is secure in terms of two aspects:
impossibility of forgery and non-repudiation of signatory. Without the knowledge
about signing key, an attacker cannot directly produce a signature of a new quan-
tum message directly. Furthermore, as the signature process is noncommutative,
an attacker cannot change the received signature state to be that of another quan-
tum message favorable for him by implementing appropriate unitary operations.
The key information of the signatory is included in a signature state, which cannot
be changed due to the use of authentication during the verification phase, so the
signatory cannot deny what she has signed. In addition, under the assumption
that the arbitrator is trustworthy and is the real person who can verify SigKA(P )
with all the information he holds, thus the arbitrated scheme under the proposed
framework does not disobey Barnum et al.’s conclusion. This also tells that the
verification made by the arbitrator is indispensable to an arbitrated QS scheme.
4 Building a bridge between two contradictory results on signing quantum
messages
From the above section, we know Barnum et al.’s conclusion [10] about the im-
possibility of signing quantum messages does not include arbitrated QS, so it just
aimed at true QS. However, Zeng et al. presented a true QS scheme recently in
[27], which was claimed to be able to sign quantum messages with unconditional
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security. Then people wondered whether Barnum et al.’s conclusion is wrong or
Zeng et al.s scheme is not secure. In this section, we clarify this question. At first,
we review Zeng et al.’s true QS scheme [27]. Then, we show the insecurity of the
scheme by attacking it successfully using similar method presented by Barnum et
al. in [10].
4.1 Review of the true QS scheme proposed by Zeng et al.
Zeng et al. proposed a true QS scheme for the purpose of signing quantummessages
based on a suitable one-way function recently [27] and claimed that the scheme is
unconditionally secure. We briefly describe the three main phases of their scheme
as follows (More details can be found in [27]).
– In the initial phase, the main goal is to generate a signing key Ks and a verifica-
tion key Kv by constructing a one-way function G : {L,X, Tij} → {U, ‖T‖
1/2},
where L is a linear transformation mapping x = (x0, x1, ..., xk−1) ∈ R
k to
y(X) = y0(x) = [x0, y1(x), ..., y2k−1(x)]
T ∈ R2k and making any k-element sub-
set of {x0, y1, ..., y2k−1} linearly independent, T makes T [yr1, yr2 , ..., yrk ]
T =
T [x0, yrk+1 , ..., yr2k−1 ]
T , and U satisfies U |yr1 〉r1 |yr2 〉r2 ...|yrk 〉rk = |x0〉r1 |yrk+1〉r2
. . . |yr2k−1〉rk .Ks is expressed asKs = {L,X} andKv is set asKv = {U, ‖T‖
1/2}.
– In the signing phase, according to Ks, the signatory Alice prepares 2k − 1
ancilla states |ω(X)〉 = |y1(X)〉1...|y2k−1(X)〉2k−1 and encodes the message
state P with a wave function 〈x0|P 〉 as |S˜〉 =
∫
|P 〉|ω〉dX. Then Alice prepares
a two-particle entangled state |Ω˜〉 =
∫
R
|yk+1〉r2 |yk+1〉rk+1dx in terms of Ks and
generates a signature state |S〉 = |S˜〉 ⊗ |Ω˜〉. Finally |S〉 and |P 〉 are sent to the
receiver Bob.
– Bob implements the verification process by the following four steps: (1) Bob
checks whether the state |S〉 is a 2k-particle QECC by performing a syndrome
measurement on it. (2) In terms of Kv, Bob decodes |S˜〉 as
Kv |S〉 → U |S˜〉 = J‖T‖
1/2
∫
{|P 〉r1 |yrk+1〉r2 |yrk+1〉rk+1 ...
⊗ |yr2k−1〉rk |yr2k−1〉r2k−1 |}dX
= J‖T‖1/2|P 〉r1 |Ω〉r2,rk+1 |Ω〉r3,rk+2 ...|Ω〉rk,r2k−1 ,
where J is the Jacobian for the transformation from X to y(X), and |Ω〉i,j =∫
R
|yl〉i|yl〉jdx is an entanglement state of particles i and j, i = r2, ..., rk, j, l =
rk+1, ..., r2k−1; (3) Bob verifies the entanglement properties of k − 1 states
|Ω〉r2,rk+1 , |Ω〉r3,rk+2 , ..., |Ω〉rk,r2k−1 , respectively. (4) Bob checks whether the
decoded message state is the same as the received message state, and tests the
equality of the decoded two-particle entangled state |Ω〉r2,rk+1 and the received
two-particle entangled state |Ω˜〉. If there is a failure in any step, Bob will reject
|S〉 and stop the protocol.
4.2 Cryptanalysis of the reviewed true QS scheme
The above scheme used for signing quantum messages [27] does not involve a
trustable arbitrator to help the receiver verify the signature. Any receiver who
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is not always trustworthy can verify the validity of the signature directly. This
scheme obviously violates Barnum et al.’s conclusion [10] which stated that signing
quantum messages is impossible since any scheme which allows one receiver to read
a quantum message also allows the receiver to modify the message without the risk
of being detected, and therefore all potential receivers of an authenticated message
must be trustworthy. Therefore, if Barnum et al.’s conclusion is right, Zeng et al.’s
scheme cannot be secure; or the other way round.
In the following, we show that Barnum et al.’s conclusion also adapts to Zeng
et al.’s scheme and the scheme is insecure. Firstly, we assume the receiver Bob gets
the message P and the corresponding valid signature |S〉 = |S˜〉⊗ |Ω˜〉 using Zeng et
al.’s scheme. We then show Bob can forge a valid signature |S′〉 of another message
P ′ beneficial to him using the following three steps:
– After decoding |S˜〉 using the way expressed in Eq. (1), Bob replaces the decoded
message state |P 〉 with a new message state |P ′〉, and the state of the whole
system is changed to |Φ〉 = J‖T‖1/2|P ′〉r1 |Ω〉r2,rk+1 |Ω〉r3,rk+2 ...|Ω〉rk,r2k−1 .
– Bob applies U†, the inverse transformation of U , on |Φ〉 to get |S˜′〉 = U†|Φ〉.
– Bob generate the signature state |S′〉 = |S˜′〉 ⊗ |Ω˜〉 of |P ′〉 by combing |S˜′〉 and
|Ω˜〉.
The new message-signature pair (P ′, |S′〉) is valid as it can be shown to pass
the four steps of the verification phase due to the following points: 1) |S〉 Bob
holds is supposed to be a valid signature, so the entanglement properties of
|Ω〉r2,rk+1 , |Ω〉r3,rk+2 , ..., |Ω〉rk,r2k−1 are kept and the decoded state |Ω〉r2,rk+1 will
be the same as |Ω˜〉. That means Step (3) and Step (4) can be passed; 2) Due to
U |S˜′〉 = UU†|Φ〉 = |Φ〉, Step (2) should also be passed; 3) Suppose |S′′〉 = |S˜′′〉⊗|Ω˜〉
is the correct signature of |P ′〉, then |S˜′′〉 must be a 2k-particle QECC. As U |S˜′′〉 =
|Φ〉 = U |S˜′〉, |S˜′〉 is identical to |S˜′′〉 and also is a 2k-particle QECC which implies
that Step (1) will be passed.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown arbitrated QS does not disobey Barnum et al.’s
conclusion about the impossibility of QS for quantum messages [10], and the ar-
bitrated QS under the proposed framework is possible to sign quantum messages
with unconditional security. In addition, we have also explained that the existing
true QS scheme presented by Zeng et al. [27] cannot get away from the restriction
of Barnum et al.’s conclusion since the scheme is shown to be insecure. Never-
theless, Barnum et al.’s negative result does not preclude the possibility of QS
for classical messages. So, how to construct efficient QS schemes to sign classical
messages deserve further work.
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